

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Published in:
Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology

DOI:
10.1080/00141844.2018.1544917

Publication date:
2019

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Ethnos
Journal of Anthropology

ISSN: 0014-1844 (Print) 1469-588X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/retn20

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To cite this article: Andrew Jefferson, Simon Turner & Steffen Jensen (2019) Introduction: On Stuckness and Sites of Confinement, Ethnos, 84:1, 1-13, DOI: 10.1080/00141844.2018.1544917

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00141844.2018.1544917

ETHNOS
2019, VOL. 84, NO. 1, 1–13
https://doi.org/10.1080/00141844.2018.1544917

Routledge
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Introduction: On Stuckness and Sites of Confinement

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ABSTRACT
This Introduction to the special issue develops a theoretical argument around the interrelations of space and time in sites of confinement by exploring the relationships between ghettos, camps, places of detention, prisons and the like with a focus on those people who are confined, encamped, imprisoned, detained, stuck, or forcibly removed and who are doing their utmost to cope or escape. We explore how life is lived in and across these sites of confinement by focusing on the tactics of everyday life and hope while being mindful of how ever-present forms of abjection, even death are constitutive elements of these sites. Stuckness, from this inter-disciplinary perspective, is not simply a function of the spatial form it takes. Crucially, the argument goes, we need to understand how temporality animates stuckness as an important dimension of confinement.

KEYWORDS Stuckness; confinement; mobility; temporality; prison; camp; ghetto

Loic Wacquant has observed that there are 'striking similarities and intriguing parallels' between prisons and ghettos (Wacquant 2001). Wacquant explores how prisons and ghettos constitute a single, unified system and investigates the structural similarities between them. Others, often historians, have similarly considered different sites of confinement (ghettos, townships, camps, leper colonies, etc.) under a single frame (Brown & Dikkoter 2007). In this special issue we pursue a novel argument about the relationship between ghettos, camps, places of detention, prisons and so on with a focus on those people who are confined, encamped, imprisoned, detained, stuck, or forcibly removed and who are doing their utmost to cope or escape. Collectively, the articles gathered here contribute to a theoretical argument about the interrelations of space and time in sites of confinement, while illuminating the subjective experience of confinement across different sites.[1] From a point of departure in anthropology and anthropological studies with important contributions from criminology, geography and philosophy, the contributions explore how life is lived in and across these sites of confinement by focusing on the tactics of everyday life and hope while being mindful of how ever-present forms of abjection, even death are constitutive elements of these sites.

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Stuckness, from this inter-disciplinary perspective, is not simply a function of the spatial form it takes. Crucially, we need to understand how temporality animates stuckness as an important dimension of confinement. Death, the ultimate temporal boundary, emerges as particularly significant in this regard.

The articles focus on the empirical question of how structures of stuckness, confinement and forced mobility impact on the possibilities of 'making life'. Together, the articles suggest new ways of thinking about the way temporality and spatiality intersect and overlap in the lives of people struggling to manage conditions of what Berlant (2010) has termed 'compromised ordinariness,' at the same time as they illuminate compromised lives in specific locations (Palestine, Sierra Leone, South Africa, northern Australia, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua).

For us, the ultimate stake is the connection or opposition between involuntary confinement and forced mobility, on the one hand, and desired place-making and the freedom to move on the other. This might at first sight seem cryptic but it is simply to say that on the one side we have people trapped and confined against their will *or* forced to move through war, impossible livelihood opportunities, eviction or removal. And on the other side we have people's desire to occupy particular places, to make homes, to build legacies for their children *or* to move – locally or globally – in pursuit of fresh opportunities and new challenges. The point is that there is a need to go beyond ideas that equate place with confinement and mobility with freedom.

Sites of confinement, be they prisons, ghettos, re-education camps, or refugee camps are characterised by flows and enclosures of people: dislocated, confined, stuck or mobile; and caught between the temporary and the permanent; between exclusion and inclusion; and between boundaries and their transgression. Empirical similarities can be identified across sites of confinement. This is, in itself, not of much analytical interest. Rather, it constitutes a point of departure for our analyses. What we do in this special issue is to pursue the effects of these various sites in terms of creating 'stuckness' and ask how this (sense of) 'stuckness' can best be characterised. In what follows we reserve the term confinement for the frameworks – both spatial and temporal – that structure life in camps, ghettos, prisons and so on; and we propose the term stuckness to refer to the way confinement is experienced, sensed and lived. The experience of stuckness is not simply an expression of physical confinement and spatial closure but expresses the way people make sense of confining dynamics and practices. To be stuck is a *quality* (not simply an effect or a product), we argue, of confined lives worthy of further exploration. While stuckness has been an object of anthropological inquiry for some time (Vigh 2009; Hage 2009; Hoffmann 2011), we suggest that as a quality, it is best studied across disciplines. Hence, while anthropological work is evident in the contributions, they crucially also rely on and speak from other disciplines in order to enrich the analyses of stuckness and confinement.

The sites addressed in this special issue are typically understood through spatial metaphors. The term confinement conjures up images of spatial limitations, walls, fences and enclosures. Similarly, stuckness seems to imply spatial immobility – people are stuck somewhere. Mobility, too, is a spatial metaphor, linking movement in space with freedom of choice, political agency and social potentialities, and implying

that immobility leads to the opposite: un-freedom, lack of political agency and social stagnation. In this introduction, we begin unpacking these concepts, unveiling the spatial bias and inserting temporality into the debate. This introduction is divided into three sections. In the first section, we explore spatial immobility and what it means to be stuck in space. How does spatial immobility interact with social and existential immobility? Can confined spaces create new possibilities and freedoms in terms of identities? In the second section, we consider the importance of temporality for understandings of confinement and stuckness, thinking further about what it means to be stuck in time. To be existentially and socially stuck is not just a question of being stuck in place but equally about being stuck in time. It is the sense of not making progress, of not seeing a future, which leads to a sense of stuckness that may linger. Perhaps the most extreme form of temporal stuckness is the imminent presence of death, experienced as a threat to immortality (cf Yalom 1980), a theme to which we (and our contributors) return. A third section presents what we refer to as three interrelated fault lines that we have identified as heuristic tools through which to frame the debates that the contributors address. These are homology / continuity; exclusion / inclusion and hope / abjection. The framing resists the inclination to privilege one side over the other, preferring to dwell on their both/and quality as productive, constitutive features of social practice.

Stuck in Space and the Ambiguous Potentiality of Freedom

The literature on the relationship between space and freedom is vast, multi-disciplinary, and suffused with tensions. For example, globalisation theories celebrate the mobile and the unbounded (Appadurai 1996) and/or bemoan those who are bound by space (Bauman 1998). Ghetto and prison studies, similarly link spatial immobility to loss of freedom and assume a number of other losses, Sykes' study of the pains of imprisonment being a classic example (Sykes 1958).[2] But a link between mobility and certain forms of liberated subjectivity cannot simply be assumed. This point has been forcefully argued from within the new sub-discipline known as carceral geography, a field of study that aims to combine insights from critical geography with insights from prison studies (Moran *et al.* 2013; Moran 2012). Carceral geographers have sought, like us, to destabilise the categories through which confinement is typically understood.[3] For example, the point is well made that mobility itself can be punitive and has always been an element of routines within prisons. As Gill puts it 'mobility is perfectly commensurate with confinement and has been used as a constituent element of confinement within prisons for many years' (in Gill 2013: 20; Moran *et al.* 2013: 20).

Refugee studies, on the other hand, tend to equate losses with forced mobility. Stephen Lubkemann provides a strong critique of commonsense understandings of the link between displacement and loss in refugee studies, where he argues

> that preconceived notions about the relationship between mobility and social place tend to render invisible an entire category of people whose lives are as profoundly (and sometimes more) disturbed by the effects of conflict on the mobility environment as are the lives of

> wartime migrants. However, this category of the 'displaced' ultimately move little if at all. (Lubkemann 2008: 456).

He coins the term 'forced immobility' to capture those whose lives have been displaced although they never moved physically.[4] Elsewhere, he uses the term 'lifescapes' to capture the ways in which people try to create meaningful lives and embed themselves socially across and between spaces as much as within them. He further argues that

> (t)he presumption that migration will result in the package of losses associated with the term 'displacement' tends to pre-empt analytical space in ways that preclude posing questions about what other possible meanings and effects, other than loss and disempowerment, may result from wartime migration. (Lubkemann 2008: 456).

It is this preemption and preclusion that is disrupted in this special issue by directing attention specifically to the meanings, people ascribe to their various experiences of being more or less confined in space or time.[5]

In their own right and individually, sites of confinement – prisons, camps, ghettos etc. – are central to the emergence of the social sciences, because they radicalise the central question of the relationship between structure and agency. This notion comes out in, for instance, (the reading of) Goffmann's *Total Institutions* (Goffman 1961), in the almost omnipotent Panopticon, explored by Foucault (Foucault 1977) or the habitus emerging in ghetto-settings, as analyzed by Bourdieu in the *Weight of the World* (Bourdieu 1993). However, while each of these analyses aims to explore life as well as structure, they arguably end up reproducing the all-powerful presence of the confining institutions. While there are clearly structures that bear down on people and undermine their aspirations to move when they wish or stay when it suits them, we cannot assume anything about (human) agency only by exploring the institutions that confine them. Instead we must explore, empirically, the means by which these structures of confinement are lived, negotiated, resisted and/or reproduced in daily life and through social practice.

While space is clearly central for how we may approach confinement and stuckness from the point of view of an ambiguous freedom, temporal dimensions are equally evident, for instance in the focus on aspirations. One of the more interesting attempts to overcome the unhelpful distinction between space and time is to invoke Zygmunt Bauman's classical analysis of tourists and vagabonds (1998). In this text, Bauman (1998) explains how the world has become bifurcated between what he calls the first world and the second world – the former being increasingly independent of the latter.

> Residents of the first world live in time, space does not matter for them, since spanning every distance is instantaneous. (…) Residents in the second world live in space – heavy, resilient, untouchable – which ties down time and keeps it beyond the residents' control. Their time is void; in their time "nothing ever happens". (Bauman 1998: 45).

In this world – similar to the picture that Sassen paints in relation to global expulsions taking place where the rich no longer need the poor and where states no longer can match trans-global capital and expertise and regulation (Sassen 2014) – the

inhabitants of the first world are tourists when they move, choosing to move at their leisure because they are uninhibited by space. While the inhabitants of Bauman's 'second world' have no control over space and have time in abundance, this does not mean that they do not move. The difference is that when they move, they do so without any control over space and without ease. They become what he calls the vagabonds of our time. We raise this example because it nicely demonstrates that while we cannot assume a link between (im-)mobility and (un-)freedom, time and space are still important, and they play different roles according to the position one occupies in the world. Bauman's ambition is to diagnose a world out of balance. While we sympathise with this ambition, he introduces a 'new' form of distinction – that some live in space and others live in time. Hence, there is still a need to address confinement and stuckness in terms of temporality in its own right.

Stuck in Time, Relationality and the Potentiality of Death

While there are certainly many ways to explore the relationship between temporality, stuckness and confinement, this special issue emphasises two specific routes, namely via issues of hope, foreboding and anticipation on the one hand and issues of relationality, kinship or relatedness (Carstens 2000) on the other. Below, we outline these two ways of looking at temporality in relation to confinement. We begin with the relational and move towards anticipation, foreboding and hope.

To think of time through relations is to recognise the way we invest in time collectively and often for others. We project ourselves through time, even across generations, via our relationships to significant other; to kin. Relationships with significant others are infused with obligations and obligations always exist across time. The ubiquity of obligation and debt relationships is such that to be free of obligation or expectation is equivalent to social death. The hope for a different future – and the concomitant fear that there is no other future – is often seen as an individual endeavour. However, narratives and structures of kinship – and in particular of offspring – in the cases raised in this special issue, demonstrate that the projected future may also be the future of kin. In other words, while individuals may see no way out of the present 'circuit of confinement' – whether the camp, the prison, the ghetto or the reservation – they continue to struggle 'for the sake of' their offspring. The idea of kinship is itself a way of imagining time and immortality. Kinship – or what Janet Carstens (2000) calls cultures of relatedness – seems to offer some of the few possible support networks in situations of desperation and in the absence of other structures of support. As da Cunha (2008) in her analysis of the relation between prison and low income and criminalised, urban neighbourhoods in Portugal argues, kinship structures are absolutely central for survival in the prison at the same time as they are reconfigured in relation to incarceration. Waltorp and Jensen's analysis (this issue) equally confirms the centrality and amenability of kinship structures under duress, as favours and counter favours between kin are drawn inside and outside the prisons. Jefferson and Segal (this issue) also touch on the centrality of offspring for parents in situations of stuckness, highlighting the tiredness associated with uncertain futures for children and the grief and sense of

foreboding associated with children dying. Eric Worby's (Worby 2010) exploration of how Zimbabwean migrants newly arrived in Johannesburg, attempt to avoid contact with ever-craving kin who demand housing, food, access to contacts and jobs in a situation where all resources are scarce also offers a rather tragic streak to the account of kinship. Similar demands are identified in relation to demands from inmates on their families (Das *et al.* 2008).

While time in camps, prisons and ghettos is often portrayed as time on standby – as if time stands still while real time continues to move relentlessly on, creating an angst of being left behind and becoming out of touch – kinship ties break this timelessness. They link the inside to the outside – as when inmates stay in touch with family on the outside. And they link the present to hopes for a future; a future that the individual may not enjoy but which he or she may enjoy through their offspring.

One of the most striking characteristics of all the cases explored in this special issue, is the way in which the control of time is taken away from people, or forced upon people, and how the sense of having a future or not is essential to the strategies that they adapt in the present. In other words, the un-freedom of their confinement is often more temporal than spatial, and what seems at stake is the individual's ability (or not) to imagine, or propel themselves toward, a future (Turner 2015). Can the Capetonian prisoner imagine a future beyond confinement when the prison and the township are so closely entangled, as Jensen and Waltorp show in this issue and as da Cunha (2008) suggests in her analysis of what she calls the carceral continuum?

Hope is perceived by some scholars as a means through which to imagine a better, distant future, thus enabling the individual to endure suffering in the present. Hopefulness, Ghassan Hage argues, is 'a disposition to be confident in the face of the future, to be open to it and welcoming to what it will bring, even if one does not know for sure what it will bring' (Hage 2003: 24). An alternative orientation to locating hope as an intrinsic capacity, or disposition, is to look for signs of hope exhibited in everyday practice, to ask how hope is maintained against all the odds, to examine the obstinacy of hope. If hope 'is the human attribute which simultaneously reconciles us to our ontological status as traveller and propels us along the path to ourselves' (Webb 2007: 69) then we need to attend to the propellant work that hope does rather than simply positing its existence or absence as a disposition (Jefferson 2014). This is where we find the notion of anticipation useful (Vigh 2011). We understand anticipation to be an embodied practice, a subtle sensing of what the future holds whether it be positively flavoured or laced with foreboding.

Several of the articles in this special issue explore situations where hopes for a (better) future seem impossible and where death appears as an ever-present potentiality, overshadowing the lives of the living. In his contribution, Dennis Rodgers illustrates how urban regeneration and elite politics are closing more and more spaces of hope. In their article, Jefferson and Segal examine the intertwining of living and dying in situations of 'compromised ordinariness'. Similarly, Turner and Løvgren show how death is ever-present for the young men in Rwanda's re-education camps. However, the spectre of death – as a potentiality – does not in itself necessarily obfuscate life or hope totally. Several scholars have attempted to explore the tension between what Amanda Hammar

(2014) frames as desperation and creativity. Susan Whyte, for instance, terms acting in the present in relation to an unknown future as being in the 'subjunctive mode' (Whyte 2005) capturing the way propositions and practices are always already suffused with doubt, fears and hopes. In a similar move, Henrik Vigh uses the term 'social navigation' to explore how individuals relate to a future in a constantly moving and indeterminate terrain (Vigh 2009).

Fault Lines

We have identified three fault lines that emerge from the different contributions to this special issue, and that usefully frame the subsequent explorations of people's attempts to orient themselves and maneuver through, across and between confining sites and temporalities. These fault lines are between homology / continuity; exclusion / inclusion; and hope / abjection. Below, we unpack these three fault lines in slightly more detail.

Homology / Continuity

This fault line is analytical rather than theoretical. It focuses attention on the relationship between sites. While the comparison between prisons, ghettos and camps intuitively makes sense, what kind of sense is it? When Wacquant argues that the ghetto and prison 'meet and mesh' (2001), he sees them as part of a continuum in a grander picture of confinement. In a similar manner, Angela Davis (1998) explores the prison industrial complex where the ghetto and the prison become part of a huge repressive complex, serving the needs of the powerful. In this way, prison and ghetto do not merely resemble each other; they are part of a system or a world in which poorer and blacker are confined and excluded. Different sites of confinement do not only resemble one another. Sometimes they share genealogies or morph from one type to another. For example, in this issue Michel Agier argues that over time camps become ghettos, thus challenging the assumption that camps simply immobilise those who inhabit them while maintaining the idea of a 'worldwide landscape' of places of banishment. For us, the analytical opposition between homology and continuity is about whether we see different sites of confinement in terms of one another or as part of a continuous system. The latter is what Waltorp and Jensen's analysis suggests, as they explore carceral continuums in South Africa. They show how the spatial division between township and prison is constantly blurred while residents, inside and outside the prison, struggle hard to both maintain the distinctions and reach across the boundaries to produce what they term awkward entanglements. Le Marcis, writing about prisons in the Ivory Coast, demonstrates homologies between the informal power structures of the prison and the society outside, claiming that the prison mirrors society. Clearly, sites of confinement are related to each other either in the way that they confine people, by being part of a system or a world or being different stages in a process of confinement. But the nature of the relationship cannot be assumed. If we want to know how the boundary between inside or outside is constituted, policed and transgressed, we must approach specific cases empirically. This is what Elizabeth

Povinelli does when she follows her informants and friends in Northern Australia across institutional boundaries of ghetto, slum, camps and prison to avoid capture and continue living their lives. She demonstrates how the formal terminology of the same site has changed over time, reflecting the political context of the time – from colonial to neo-liberal government. However, for those who inhabit them, these sites are comparable on the level of the effect they have on life prospects. In this way, they do not distinguish between sites of confinement but see them as continuous sites of struggle.

While this special issue to some extent contributes with an understanding that stresses similarities across sites of confinement, to suggest that they are the same or are experienced identically would clearly be a fallacy. Hence, there is a need to constantly subject the actual relationship between sites of confinement to interrogation, rather than assuming specific types of relationships.[6]

Exclusion / Inclusion

This fault line relates to the intentions of confinement. Is confinement intended to exclude people from some version of mainstream society, be that polite society (Jensen 2008) or the 'national order of things' (Malkki 1995) or is the purpose one of disciplining or including, be that in re-education camps (Turner 2014) or in prisons (Foucault 1977)? Again, the fault line requires us to think through this, rather than come down on one or the other side. Take South African homelands, for example. As it has been argued by several scholars (e.g. Ferguson 1994; Platzsky & Walker 1985), the homelands constituted 'surplus people's places', that is, their purpose was primarily one of exclusion. However, they were clearly also labour reserves in which capital reproduced labour at no cost to itself (Kopytoff 1989). Hence, the question is not one of either exclusion or inclusion; it is a question of complex historical trajectories (Jensen and Zenker 2015). Also in the contributions by Povinelli, and Turner and Løvgren complex historical trajectories determine the relationship between inclusion and exclusion. Turner and Løvgren argue that Iwawa camp, located on an uninhabited island in Lake Kivu, simultaneously removes delinquent youth out of view, while it also attempts to transform these abject bodies into model citizens of the nation.

As Agier (2009) notes, for Wacquant (2008) the ghetto is created by the distance to the state, whereas the hyper-ghetto is created by abandonment. While ghettos served a function as a labour reserve, the hyperghetto is marked by 'deproletarianization', by the fact that its inhabitants no longer play a role for the elite. The question, Agier asks (Agier 2009: 856), is whether we may see this as a global process, creating 'territories of abandonment'. Sassen (2014) equally suggests that post 1980s late capitalism no longer needs a proletariat, resulting in the expulsion of people and places on a massive global scale. While these authors provide insights at a global scale, in this special issue we explore the effects at the local scale for those whom they theorise as abandoned. Wacquant (2008) claims that the process of confining people to specific territories also provided the opportunity to create community, famously so in the Jewish ghettos and in African-American ghettos on the South side of Chicago. Jensen found

similar dynamics in South African townships (Jensen 2008). In this issue, Michel Agier makes a similar argument. However, the hyperghetto of our times, Wacquant argues, is marked so much by fragmentation and abjection that political identities and community can hardly exist. Dennis Rodgers raises similar questions in his contribution to this special issue, as he explores how urban transformation in Managua has increasingly marginalised the residents of a particular neighbourhood, which he has studied for almost two decades. While the marginalisation is primarily social and economic, the almost insurmountable walls consisting of a set of ring roads within which his interlocutors must strive to cope with a new round of exclusions, give it spatial form.

In this way, confinement invariably excludes and includes, for shorter or for longer periods of time, sometimes deliberately and sometimes for no apparent reason except for people being in the way or forgotten; either too visible or invisible. And while some forms of confinement apparently have the intention of simply excluding 'human waste' – such as refugee camps, Guantanamo and ghettos – even these sites may intend aspects of betterment for later – hypothetical – inclusion into society (Turner 2010; Jensen 2010). Likewise, sites that appear to have the aim of transforming outsiders into insiders – such as prisons and education camps – de facto often have the effect of simply excluding, as becomes quite evident in Turner and Løvgren's contribution where re-education becomes abjection.

Hope / Abjection

Our final fault line is that between hope and abjection. As mentioned, when we explore confinement, there is a tendency to focus on immobility and lack of agency. However, even in situations of absolute confinement there is movement of sorts; the lines of flight that Deleuze and Guattari (1988) insist on. Indeed, 'absolute' confinement or 'total institutions' (Goffman 1961) may be misleading misnomers, at least when bandied about without accompanying empirical analysis. For instance, to stand on the roof of the largest prison in the Philippines, the New Bilibid Prison, home to some 19,000 inmates, is a sobering experience for all who think of prisons as 'total institutions'. Resembling a Brueghel painting, the onlooker sees a beauty pageant taking place in the distance, between prison gang members; closer, a preacher delivers a sermon; while to the right, a basketball game is going on. Despite this evidence of the less than total Philippine prison, a more universal theme emerges when one examines experiences of confinement. A central trope capturing the problematic of confinement in Philippine prisons as well as in relocation sites, is that of *buryong* (Jensen 2014). While the term denotes an existential fear that the immobility of the present will perpetuate itself eternally into the future it also captures the need to act to deal with the sense of desperate stuckness in space and in time. Thus, stuckness is not necessarily equivalent to passivity. In Jensen's account, the possibility of succumbing is constantly present but mostly avoided by his interlocutors through agility, perseverance and cunning. This resonates, in turn, with the experience of Povinelli and her friends in a flimsy boat in Northern Australia (but representative of experience more generally) which she characterises in the following terms: 'We are neither defeated, nor are we

successful. We persevere.' (2011: 115) But, as she poignantly notes, only a few of them in fact persevered, while many succumbed.

What, then, about those who do not obstinately persevere or for whom death is an ever-present possibility? This is where abjection enters the picture. In this special issue, Rodgers directly challenges the insistence on hope in his longitudinal studies of the fate of ex-gangsters increasingly confined within the perimeters of an ever more excluded Managua ghetto. More radically, three contributions to this special issue deal directly with issues of death and mourning. Turner and Løvgren explore how young men are constantly battling death in a re-education camp to emerge as people – where far from all make it. While Foucault's path-breaking study of prisons in Europe (Foucault 1977) leads us to see them as sites of bio-politics, Le Marcis argues in this issue that colonialism created quite different circumstances in Africa. Le Marcis explores what he, drawing on Achille Mbembe, calls the necropolitics of the Ivorian prison. And invoking Chekhov, Jefferson and Segal revisit material from West Africa and Occupied Palestine to examine the conversion of everyday tiredness in to a sense of abject foreboding. Their analysis unpacks the significance of the 'confines of time' for people living under the constantly compromising shadow of violence, poverty, death and dying. Exhaustion and monotony rather than energy and opportunity are foregrounded; hope is largely absent and orientation towards the future takes the form of foreboding or living towards death. For Jefferson and Segal, this is stuckness.

Related to this is the issue of choice. Lisa Guenther writes of 'the facticity of being thrown into a world that one did not choose but with which one must come to terms in one's own singular way' (Guenther 2013: 202). She quotes Fanon writing about consent: 'I had to choose. What do I mean? I had no choice' (Ibid: 227). This is perhaps the most minimal version of the stuckness thesis – people are stuck with the world they occupy at the time in which they occupy it. She also quotes Robert King, a member of the Angola Three held in prison for thirty-two years, referring back to his time in prison, after release, saying 'I am still there'. King is not physically in prison any longer but he is 'still there'. This is an apt designation of the experience of abject stuckness. Conditions of confinement leave people 'still there' literally, spatially, temporally and relationally. Being 'still there' is one version of what stuckness means (and the double meaning of 'still' is significant here: they remain and they are not moving (very much)). Whereas orientations to hope seek to make sense of how people cope against all the odds, focusing on abjection resists well-intentioned projections of hope onto hopeless experience. Again, hope and abjection are not opposites but interlinked and often co-present in experience and visibly so under confined circumstances.

This fault line suggests a series of questions that the articles pursue in different ways: what choices do people have under extreme, confined, compromised circumstances; what kind of subjectivities can be formed when the present is circumscribed, and the future is unknown or as Lauren Berlant (2010: 110) eloquently puts it, when there is 'no living as if not in a relation to death which is figured in all of the potential loss that precedes it'? Stuckness, we suggest, is not a choice. Stuckness is a given and for

many a curse. But a curse with which they (or many of them at least) deal or actively anticipate, either in the form of hope or foreboding.

In this introduction, we have emphasised the ways in which stuckness, dislocation and mobility relate to each other through a number of institutional forms of power – the ghetto, the prison, the camp etc. – which we refer to as confinement. We have explored how life is lived in and across these sites and argued that stuckness cannot be simply understood as a function of the spatial form it takes. We need to understand how temporality always already animates stuckness, revealed perhaps most visibly by the ubiquity of death. Against – or complementing – this tragic perspective, Povinelli, at the end of her ethnography, offers us one small glimpse of hope when, rather than retaining focus on the deprivations and struggles of her friends in the Northern Territory, Australia, she shifts attention to a police car passing through a gate on the road away from the community, hinting subtly at the possibility of hope and life, even under highly compromised and compromising conditions.

Notes

1. It is worth noting that our focus is not on sites of voluntary confinement, that is, not on the experience of hermits, monks or nuns, or recluses or such like, though we suspect that the perspectives shared in this collection would provide food for thought for scholars with such interests.
2. Sykes influentially identified four deprivations associated with imprisonment: deprivation of liberty; deprivation of goods and services; deprivation of sexual relationships; deprivation of autonomy.
3. The approach of carceral geographers resonates with our own orientation to the extent that they too are concerned with multiple sites considering specifically the analytical entwining of imprisonment and migrant detention and with the subjective experiences of confinement (see Moran *et al.* 2017).
4. In prisons we see a flip side of this: populations who are 'in custody' are typically understood as static and immobile whereas evidence of movement is widespread be it prisoner arrivals / departures / transfers, cell changes; disciplinary sanctions and so on.
5. Conscious of Martha Nussbaum's critique of Sen we are also keen to avoid implying by our focus on stuckness and confinement that freedom is a universally desirable 'general all-purpose social good' (Nussbaum 2003: 44).
6. Relatedly, the tendency evident in popular consciousness and critical scholarship to reproduce fixed notions of 'the' prison has been critically analysed by Armstrong and Jefferson (2017).

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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